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ABSTRACT 
This paper offers an analysis of (1) the practices of a donor agency involved in a 
private-public partnership (PPP) to account for its inputs in a development project 
through measurement frameworks and progress reports, and (2) the effects of the 
increased focus on results on the ability of a donor agency to account for its 
actions. This study examines the practices of Sida engaged as a donor agency in a 
PPP with UNIDO and Volvo in a project called Heavy Duty Equipment and 
Commercial Vehicles Maintenance Training Academy (HDECoVA) in Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia. The analysis of documents and interviews collected during a field trip to 
Ethiopia reveals that a mismatch exists between the results captured by the 
project’s measurement frameworks and progress reports developed by UNIDO, and 
the expectations of the Swedish government. The study further reveals that this 
mismatch can lead to tension between the different actors in the partnership and an 
increased vulnerability of Sida. The findings of this research lead to the conclusion 
that there are reasons to believe these challenges could become a constrain for 
donor agencies to address complex development challenges in the future or pose 
challenges for the collaborative process of PPPs.  
 	  
Keywords: accountability, results, private-public partnerships, aid, development 
cooperation. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
“Not everything that can be measured is important and not everything 
important can be measured.”  
– Albert Einstein 
 
In parallel with a recent shift in the international aid architecture from conditional aid 
towards partnerships, there has been a growing pressure on development 
cooperation actors to demonstrate performance in order to account for their inputs 
in development projects. In response to these pressures and a growing lack of 
public confidence in aid effectiveness, there has been an increased focus on 
achieving and reporting on results in development cooperation projects. Yet little 
effort has been devoted to investigating the practices or effects of implementing the 
increased focus on results in the context of the new aid architecture. The present 
study will look into the practices of the Swedish International Development 
Cooperation Agency (Sida) engaged in a private-public partnership (PPP) with the 
United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) and Volvo, to account 
for its involvement as a donor agency in the Heavy Duty Equipment and Commercial 
Vehicles Maintenance Training Academy (HDECoVA) project in the capital of 
Ethiopia, Addis Ababa. By doing so this study aims to bridge the gap between the 
current debates that exist in the academic and institutional literature on 
performance-based accountability and the focus on results. 
 The empirical results of this study show that tensions can arise between the 
increased pressure on Sida to demonstrate accountability based on performance 
and its practices to answer to these demands through a focus on results. Building 
on a further analysis of these findings, the present paper identifies the self-
reinforcing nature of these tensions and provides suggestions for limiting these 
tensions in future development projects based on the hierarchy that underlies the 
PPP that at the focus of this research. By doing so, this study provides a critical 
reflection on the practices currently adopted by Sida that could be used as a 
starting point for donor agencies to develop more effective methods to manage the 
expectations of their account-holders when involved in a PPP. 
 The paper is organized as follows. Section two comprises a theoretical 
background and literature review of the ongoing aid and development debate, the 
recent focus in the global aid architecture on PPPs and the accompanying demands 
for performance-based accountability and results. Section three will account for the 
 2 
methodology and case selection, followed by an introduction to the case study used 
in this research in section four. Section five outlines the findings of the empirical 
research towards the practices and effects of answering to the demands for 
performance-based accountability through an increased focus on results. Section 
six includes an in-depth discussion of these findings where the implementation of 
the focus on results and the demands for performance-based accountability are 
analyzed more closely. The final section concludes and discusses further research 
recommendations.  
 
2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND  
2.1 The aid and development debate  
Whether or not foreign aid is an effective vehicle for achieving development has 
been a much contested topic on the research agenda for decades. In an attempt to 
conceptualize the competing views on the value of foreign aid, Gulrajani (2011) 
offers a helpful binary presentation of ideological positions within the current aid 
debate as he divides scholars in terms of aid ‘radicals’ and aid ‘reformers’. The 
radicals, who represent right-wing and left-wing aid critics, are united by their belief 
that development aid is ‘unnecessary at best, pernicious at worst’ (p. 200). The 
radicals on the right promote neoliberal perspectives as they maintain that not only 
has aid failed to spur economic development, it keeps the poor dependent on 
foreign donors and as such prevents underdeveloped countries from growing out of 
a state of poverty (including Easterly, 2006 and Svensson, 2000). Following this line 
of reasoning, Zambian economist Moyo (2009) argues for the replacement of aid 
with free market policies, open trade and foreign investment. Criticism of left-wing 
radicals instead focuses on the discourse of development and its relation to the 
political and economical domination of rich Western societies over Third World 
states. Arturo Escobar (1997; 2011), one of the most influential post-development 
writers, in fact speaks of development as an invention of modernity that has 
constructed our notion underdeveloped countries and the form development took 
without considering alternative development paths that would recognize the 
autonomy and agency of local communities. As a result, writers belonging to this 
camp recommend looking beyond development aid and applaud social movements 
that build on local knowledge and experience (Gulrajani, 2011).  
 The aid reformers, on the other side, represent the more optimistic group of 
scholars who are committed to the development potential of the aid system and 
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have elaborated on ways to improve the current organization of aid. Belonging to 
this ideology we find scholars such as Gunnar Myrdal (1968), who criticized the 
general neglect of the very poor groups in development aid and how corruption 
hinders the structural change necessary for development to occur, and Jeffrey 
Sachs (2005) who argued in favor of Rosenstein-Rodan’s (1943) ‘big push’ model, 
emphasizing that a rapid increase of aid is needed in order to establish a balanced 
economic growth.  
 The most recent development in the aid debate among reformers grew out of 
critiques towards the approach of conditionality, which refers to the practice of 
donors to impose conditions on the way aid money is spent and on government 
policies, that had become a common practice in the aid system (Collier, 2007; 
Collier et al., 1997; Kanbur, 2000). Three critiques of conditional aid relations 
dominate, all pointing to the need for recipient ownership of aid activities. Firstly, the 
institutional policy reforms that were implemented under donor-dominant conditions 
were perceived as being premised on universalized best practices, which did not 
allow for local context to be taken into proper account (Gulrajani, 2011). Secondly, 
conditional aid was criticized for being intrusive, in some cases even referred to as 
imperialism or neo-colonialism, which undermined the sovereignty of recipient 
governments and in turn made domestic governments or societies oppose the 
policy changes they have adopted causing failures of conditional lending (Higgot, 
1998; Amin, 2009). Thirdly, the continuous negotiations that occur between donors 
and recipients have posed constrains on recipient governments to devise policies 
based on their own priorities and independently of donors (Whitfield, 2009). Within 
the new consensus that emerged amongst donors and reformist on ‘ownership’ as a 
remedy to the effects of externally imposed conditionality, Whitfield and Fraser 
(2008) identified two opposing conceptualizations of the term. ‘Ownership as 
commitment’ often refers to the commitment of recipient governments to implement 
the institutional reforms that donors encouraged them to adopt. ‘Ownership as 
control’ on the other hand, is described as the degree of control recipient 
governments have over the process and outcome of aid negotiations. The notion of 
ownership triggered a shift in aid policy towards the so-called ‘partnership era’ in 
the period from the mid-1990s until the present day. However, scholars have voiced 
criticism towards this new aid architecture for being a continuation of 
macroeconomic constrains on recipient governments combined with even more far-
reaching influences in areas where they prior had no say (Swedlund, 2013; Whitfield 
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& Fraser, 2009). The following section gives a more detailed account of the new 
development in aid policy.  
 
2.2 Towards private-public partnerships  
The newly emerged shift in aid policy goes beyond the constellation of traditional 
actors of donor and recipient governments, as it has recognized a range of 
nontraditional stakeholders as important actors for driving development (Geldof et 
al., 2011). One of the forms that development partnerships can take nowadays is the 
partnership between private and public actors with which this study is concerned, 
namely public-private partnerships or PPPs. While no clearly agreed on 
conceptualization exists of the meaning of PPPs, most definitions provided in PPP 
literature related to at least of three distinct features: (1) that PPPs are relatively 
enduring and ‘institutionalized transboundary interactions’ between public and 
private actors, (2) the aim to bring about a desired public policy outcome or public 
goods, and (3) the sharing of risks and the commitment of resources among the 
participatory actors. Accordingly, this paper adopts van Ham and Koppenjan’s 
(2001) definition of PPP, which seems to incorporate all the of the above mentioned 
criteria, as a ‘cooperation of some sort of durability between public and private 
actors in which they jointly develop products and services and share risks, costs 
and resources which are connected with these products’ (p. 598). 
 In explaining the emergence of this type of partnerships, scholars largely 
bring forward two contested arguments. The first relies on the normative 
assumption that PPPs are underpinned by the premise that the exploitation of 
different resources and expertise of a partnership can solve complex global 
challenges that governments and international organizations have failed to address 
(see Backstrand, 2006; Huxham & Vaugen, 2000; Warner & Sullivan, 2004). 
Supporting this assumption, Binkerhoff (2002) emphasizes that ‘no one organization 
is in a position to understand all the intricacies and interdependencies of 
international development challenges or to command the necessary information, 
skills, and relationships to address them. Partnership is a rational and highly 
appropriate response to this complexity’ (p. 18). This explanation has been 
challenged by scholars who argue that PPPs were not created to address the needs 
of development countries but to serve the interest of powerful actors, as they 
consolidate the privatization of global governance and reinforce dominant neoliberal 
globalization policies (see Andonova, 2006; Hoering, 2003; Thomson & Perry, 2006). 
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These voices of criticism have provoked larger questions regarding the legitimacy, 
effectiveness and accountability of PPPs, which have been translated in new 
notions of accountability with a strong focus on performance (Willems & van 
Dooren, 2011), as will be elaborated on in the section hereafter.  
 
2.3 Accountability and the focus on results  
The body of literature that attempts to conceptualize the notion of accountability is 
widespread and varied. In more general terms, accountability is about the ‘provision 
of two parties where the one who is accountable, explains or justifies actions to the 
one to whom the account is owed’ (Swift, 2001, p. 17). The relationship between 
these two parties is often further described in terms of principal and agent, where 
the agent is assumed to choose its own interests over those of the principal if they 
remain unchecked by regulation (Gray et al., 1997). In essence, this model is guided 
by the premise that the agent cannot be trusted and as such the theory places great 
emphasis on control and answerability. More detailed conceptualizations of the 
nature of the relationship between these two parties are offered by scholars such as 
Keohane (2006), who distinguishes between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ accountability. 
Internal accountability means that principles are accountable to agents to which 
they are institutionally bound and external accountability means that decision-
makers have to justify their action to those who are decisions.  
 Willems and van Dooren (2011) provide a relevant contribution to these 
frameworks that broadens our understanding of accountability, as they attempt to 
bridge the above-described idea of ‘answerability’ and the notion of ‘managing 
expectations’. More than the actual fact of having to justify or defend one’s actions, 
which they refer to as answerability, Willems and van Dooren describe 
accountability as a strategy for managing the prior expectations for such actions or 
behavior. The agent in this model, is confronted with many principals, who hold 
diverging and sometimes even conflicting expectations.  
 In pas decades there has been a considerable shift in the accountability 
discourse within the aid debate. While traditionally accountability was primarily 
concerned with defining rules and procedures and controlling whether behavior and 
actions were in line with these expectations, in recent times the emphasis is shifting 
towards performance (Jos & Tompkins, 2004; Osborne & Plastrik, 2000). More 
specifically, performance-based accountability is concerned with establishing 
measures of desirable outcomes and using these tools to measure outputs or 
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results (Willems & van Dooren, 2011). In response to this trend and a growing lack of 
public confidence in aid effectiveness, there has been an increased focus on 
achieving and demonstrating results amongst development cooperation actors. The 
growing consensus on the new principles for providing aid cumulated in the Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in March 2005. Guided by international 
commitments to manage for results – ‘managing resources and improving decision-
making for results’, and mutual accountability – ‘donors and partners are 
accountable for developing results’1 , the Paris Declaration has created further 
demand for results that indicate the performance and progress, and evaluate the 
impact of development projects. The focus on results within the development 
cooperation community is further stimulated by the belief that that an increased 
focus on results is key to effective resource allocation and can positively impact the 
efficiency and effectiveness of aid efforts (Holzapfel, 2014). However, concerns have 
been voiced whether this consensus can be misleading or even problematic. One 
argument provided is the arguably unrealistic expectations of the account-holders, 
for example as Eyben (2008) points to the practice of asking aid recipients to 
demonstrate quantifiable results of health or education projects within a fixed period 
of time. Another concern that is raised in the debate is the difficulty of attributing 
outputs or results to an individual actor of a partnership, for example as Da Costa 
(2009) argues that most outcomes are influenced by a large range of factors that 
cannot be attributed to one particular intervention or development agency. These 
concerns have, however, predominantly been recognized by institutional, rather 
than academic research.  
 
2.4 Research  question  
The academic literature that explores the rise of PPPs and the related calls for 
accountability is extensive. However, studies that investigate the problems in the 
implementation of performance-based accountability are limited. There is generally 
a lack of understanding of the opportunities and risks associated with an increased 
focus on results in development cooperation projects. Concerns voiced by the 
development community suggest that serious constrains or challenges exist for 
development cooperation actors due to an increased pressure to focus on results. 
In an attempt to bridge the worlds of theory and practice, this study intents to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The Paris Declaration sets out five partnership commitments. The two outlined in this paper 
were complemented with ‘ownership’, ‘alignment’, and ‘harmonization’.  
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analyze the ‘focus on results’ attitude as the principal tool of accountability in 
development projects. The study will look into (1) the practices of a donor agency 
involved in a PPP to account for its inputs in a development project through 
measurement frameworks and performance reports, and (2) the effects of the 
increased focus on results on the ability of the donor agency to account for its 
actions. As such, the hypothesis that the focus on results within the development 
cooperation community is a solution to the increased demand for performance-
based accountability will function as a starting point for this study. Building on this 
hypothesis, the research will be guided by the following research question:  
 
How does the focus on results impact the practices and ability of donor agencies 
involved in a PPP project to demonstrate accountability?  
 
3. METHODOLOGY AND CASE SELECTION  
In its investigation of the practices and effects of implementing increased demands 
for performance-based accountability, this present study builds on a case study of a 
current PPP project. According to Yin (2009), case studies are appropriate for doing 
an in-depth analysis about a complex case within in context. Considering the wide 
range of stakeholders, interests and contextual conditions that are embodied in 
PPPs and the accompanying calls and practices for indicating results, a case study 
approach was considered a suitable method for the explorative purpose of this 
study. The case was selected on several criteria. Firstly, the case had to comprise a 
partnership that fulfills the three features of a PPP as identified in the previous 
section of this paper. Secondly, the project had to be aimed at bringing about 
development and should be mature enough to allow for an investigation on the 
practices of reporting results and answering to demands for accountability. Finally, 
the partners and project had to serve as an illustrative case to increase the 
likelihood that the case study would capture common practices and efforts of other 
aid agencies.  
 Based on these criteria, a PPP project was selected between Sida, Volvo, 
Selam Children’s Village (SCV) and UNIDO that has reached the mid-point of its life 
span in March 2015 (see Figure 1 below). Being the first to launch a PPP within the 
UN system, UNIDO could be regarded as an experienced actor with regards to 
implementing and managing PPP projects. Similarly, Sida has been considered to 
be an innovator in the field of development assistance (Gibson et al., 2005). As 
such, these actors are likely to have developed a set of best practices with regards 
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results-based management and reporting, meaning that if the effects of the potential 
challenges associated with answering to these demands are insignificant to these 
actors, then other development agencies are not very likely to experience such 
problems either. The sector in focus in this study is the education sector. This 
selection was primarily based on the priority that the issues of education and 
employment commonly have in development policies. Following the reasoning of 
Todaro and Smith (2009), education is ‘fundamental to the broader notion of 
expanded human capabilities that lie at the heart of the meaning of development’ (p. 
359). The logic here is that the practices that are employed in a development project 
in a major sector such as education are more likely to occur in other sectors as well. 
The country in which the investigation takes place is Ethiopia, which, being one of 
the poorest countries in the world, could be considered a illustrative case of a 
country in need of development efforts.  
 
 
 
 
The empirical investigation of this case relies on semi-structured interviews and 
document analysis. The author of this paper conducted a number (n=11) of in-depth 
interviews with the main stakeholders of the PPP at the site of the project in Addis 
Ababa, Ethiopia. The interviews took place between 6 May and 11 June 2015 and 
lasted between 40 and 90 minutes. In order to obtain an all-inclusive perspective of 
the case study, the profiles of the interviewees were purposefully selected based on 
their diversity and appropriateness to the study. Interviewees include five UNIDO 
officials involved with the implementation, management or evaluation of the 
HDECoVA project. One of these officials was specifically engaged with monitoring 
 
Figure 1: Stakeholders of the project 
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and evaluation (M&E) practices through the Learning and Knowledge Development 
Facility2 (LKDF). Furthermore, the First Secretary of Private Sector and Market 
Development of Sida was selected to reflect the donor’s view, and the Head of 
Swedish Development Cooperation in Ethiopia represented the interests of the 
Swedish embassy in Addis Ababa. In order to address the experiences of private 
actors, a manager of Volvo at the Equatorial Business Group (EBG) head office in 
Addis Ababa was included in the list of interviewees. In addition, a senior consultant 
of the Ethiopian Ministry of Education was selected for a broader perspective on the 
national development strategy of the Ethiopian government. Finally, three 
representatives of the local NGO involved in the project were interviewed 
complementing the executive view of the Managing Director as well as the practical 
experiences from one of the instructors at the academy. Following the exploratory 
nature of the empirical analysis, the interviews were semi-structured, leaving room 
for the respondents to elaborate on their personal interpretation of the issues 
discussed. In addition, this approach allowed the author to gather information that 
reached beyond her prior knowledge on the topic and subjective interpretation of 
the data, contributing to the validity of the study.  
 The empirical data for this study has been complemented with secondary 
document analyses to in the form of policy documents, performance reports, 
evaluation documents and research reports on PPP projects and policy. The 
relevance of the document analysis was twofold. Firstly, the analysis provided the 
necessary background information to conduct the elite interviews, which constituted 
the key source of information. Secondly, the document analysis served the purpose 
of placing the data derived from the interviews in a broader perspective and 
complementing some of the information provided by the respondents with actual 
and specific data. 
 The increased pressure for accountability on Sida was conceptualized in line 
with the reasoning of Willems and van Dooren (2011) as a strategy for managing the 
prior expectations of various stakeholders, or account-holders (principals) for the 
actions or behavior of the donor agency (agent). Keeping in mind the scope of this 
study, the research has limited itself to the expectations for results of the Swedish 
government (indicated by the dotted box in Figure 1), as the critical attitude of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 The Learning and Knowledge Development Facility (LKDF) was initiated by UNIDO and 
Sida to ‘provides a means to systematically learn from PPPs that target vocational training 
centres (VTCs) and skills development’ and ‘disseminate the gathered knowledge for the 
greater public good’ (LKDF, n.d.).  
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government towards aid effectiveness has had a direct effect on the practices and 
organization of Sida in recent years, leaving the Swedish development agency 
currently under increased pressure to demonstrate tangible results.  
 The expectations of the Swedish government were drawn from the Swedish 
aid policy framework, which serves as a point of departure for the government’s 
management of Swedish aid. In this document, the government’s concrete 
expectations for the results it wishes to contribute towards through multilateral 
organizations (in this case UNIDO) build on two main principles, namely relevance 
and effectiveness. The assessment of relevance is described in terms of the 
country’s own priorities and plans, as it entails ‘whether an organization’s activities 
and results contribute to meeting the overarching objective of Swedish aid and the 
sub-objectives of this framework’ (p. 55). The level of effectiveness is assessed by 
considering whether the organization “contributes towards development (results) in 
line with the relevant objectives set” and is “organized such that activities lead to 
results” (p. 55).	   The tools at hand for Sida to answer to the increased demand for 
performance-based accountability are (1) the (bi-weekly, annual and mid-term) 
progress reports delivered by UNIDO, that measure whether and how the goals of 
the project have been achieved, and (2) the indicators developed by the LKDF to 
measure the performance of each PPP project initiated by UNIDO and Sida that 
target vocational training centers (VTCs) and skills development. As such, this 
research focuses on the project’s latest Progress Report and the Mid-Term Review 
report provided by UNIDO, and the measurement frameworks How to calculate the 
costs and benefits of PPPs and Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) provided by 
LKDF. 
 
4. THE CASE STUDY  
Before introducing the actual case on which this study is built, it is relevant to briefly 
sketch the policy and development context in which the project takes place. In what 
follows, the state of affairs concerning development aid in Ethiopia and the 
development strategies and priorities that guide Swedish development work will be 
discussed.  
 
4.1 Ethiopia’s national development efforts  
Ethiopia is among the poorest countries in the world. Almost 40% of its population 
of around 80 million people lives below the defined poverty line of 45 US cents per 
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day, and the risk of starvation is a reality for some million Ethiopians annually 
(Ministry of Education, 2008). Although the country’s development efforts have 
showed promising achievements in recent years, human development indicators still 
remain at very low levels compared with the rest of the world. With only 10% of the 
urban population having completed secondary school education, around 35 million 
people of the Ethiopian work force are characterized by low skill levels and very low 
average educational attainment (Central Statistical Agency, 2014). As a result, 
studies indicate significant skill gaps all over the economy, especially in sectors that 
require a higher skill level. Recognizing the need to further develop the country’s 
human capital, the Ethiopian Government has described the expansion of social 
development and guaranteeing their quality as one of the main pillars of its Growth 
and Transformation Plan (GTP) 2010/11–2014/15 (Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Development, 2010). As the GTP further defines the Technical and Vocational 
Education and Training (TVET) program to be ‘part of the government’s capacity 
building program to strengthen engagement with, and productivity of MSEs, as key 
instrument for creation of employment opportunities’ (Ministry of Education, 2008, p. 
26), the national TVET strategy could be considered an important element of the 
overall policy framework towards development and poverty reduction.  
 Despite the Ethiopian government’s efforts to reforming the basic framework 
conditions of the TVET system, the TVET training programs have been criticized for 
not being able to address the actual competence needs in the economy. As a result 
of a lack of skilled TVET teachers and resource constrains, most TVET programs are 
of low quality, lack a practical approach, and are not in line with occupational 
standards. The structural lack of skilled manpower in turn leads to high costs for 
operators, low returns on labour for the employees, delays and lower than optimal 
utilization of capital goods, losses in productivity and an overall threat to the 
economic transformation of the country (Ministry of Education, 2008). The 2008 
TVET strategy tried to address these shortcomings by placing a high focus on 
demand-orientation, quality and relevance. The strategy further stresses the need 
for an increasing involvement of the private sector and non-governmental 
organizations in order to increase the overall quality and relevance of TVET and 
improve the accessibility and cost-effectiveness of the system.  
 
4.2 Swedish aid strategy  
Swedish aid is steered by the key principles and values outlines in the country’s 
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national aid policy framework of 2014. This document sets out the direction of aid in 
the form of a hierarchy of objectives and a number of results that Swedish aid must 
help to achieve. The three thematic priorities outlined in the document include (1) 
democracy and human rights, (2) environment and climate, and (3) gender equality 
and the role of women in development, which are further broken down into six sub-
objectives 3 . At large, these sub-objectives are indented to contribute to the 
overarching objective of Swedish aid, which is ‘to create preconditions for better 
living conditions for people living in poverty and under oppression’ (Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs, 2013, p. 18). The document further emphasizes the need to seek 
ways for collaboration with traditional and non-traditional aid actors to benefit from 
the knowledge competence and capacity that exist among these actors. The 
Swedish development agency Sida plays a central role in facilitating this 
development cooperation, as it is responsible for suggesting strategies and policies 
for Swedish development cooperation, implementing strategies and manage 
contributions, and participating in Sweden’s advocacy work and dialogue with other 
countries and international organizations (Sida, n.d.). Sida’s Collaboration with the 
Private Sector policy (previously Business for Development or B4D policy) was 
developed as a result of an increased interest in collaborating with the private sector 
as an important strategy for achieving economic growth and development.  
 In recent years, Swedish development aid has suffered under the growing 
skepticism of the media and the public opinion, and a hesitance from the 
government with regards to the effectiveness of development efforts, especially 
under its new neoliberal government. As a result, Sida has faced stricter 
development priorities imposed by its government and more pressure to show 
results that contribute towards attaining the six sub-objectives of Swedish aid and 
thereby the Government’s three thematic priorities. In fact, from 2007 onwards, Sida 
is required to report annually on its concrete achievements and development 
results. In addition, the agency has faced much pressure in terms of tighter 
budgetary and managerial control from the government (Sjöstedt, 2013).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 These sub-objectives include (1) strengthened democracy and gender equality, greater 
respect for human rights and freedom from oppression, (2) better opportunities for people 
living in poverty to contribute to and benefit from economic growth and obtain a good 
education, (3) a better environment, limited climate impact and greater resilience to 
environmental impact,  climate change and natural disasters, (4) improved basic health, (5) 
safeguarding human security and freedom from violence, and (6) saving lives, alleviating 
suffering and maintaining human dignity. 
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4.3 The HDECoVA project  
The investigated case study is a PPP project on the establishment of a Heavy Duty 
Equipment and Commercial Vehicles Maintenance Training Academy, or HDECoVA, 
in the capital of Ethiopia, Addis Ababa. The project was initiated and developed as a 
response to the country’s shortage of skilled technicians for the maintenance of 
heavy duty construction and agricultural equipment and commercial vehicles that 
has threatened Ethiopia’s economic development and poverty reduction in several 
ways. By filling this gap, the project primarily aims to ‘improve Ethiopian youths’ 
access to gainful employment opportunities in advanced commercial vehicle 
maintenance through high-tech training and thereby to contribute to the poverty 
reduction effort in the country’ (UNIDO, 2012). In order to reach this objective, the 
project is designed to set up a modern, well-equipped training academy that 
provides all-round education to 25 to 30 trainees annually for the maintenance of 
heavy duty equipment and commercial vehicles. The training center is further 
intended to provide three to four years of training to its trainees from level 1 to 5 that 
is in congruence with international standards of quality and keeps up with the rapid 
development of the technology of vehicles.  
 Figure 2 shows a schematic overview of the stakeholders involved in the 
HDECoVA project. The project was initiated based on discussion between Sida, 
UNIDO, The Volvo Group, and Selam Technical & Vocational Center (STVC), who 
constitute the direct partners of the project (marked with a bold line in Figure 2). 
Sida’s main contribution to the project is in terms of financial support, as the 
development agency funds almost half of the total costs assigned to the project. 
Sida is a government agency working on behalf of the Swedish government (arrow 
A) that channels its resources through NGOs, multilateral cooperation, and the EU. 
In the current project, Sida’s resources are channeled through UNIDO (arrow B). At 
the same time, Sida has the responsibility of supervising the reporting of the 
performance of the project, and contribute to the biannual meetings with the 
stakeholders to review the progress of the project and decide on the strategic 
direction of the project (arrow C). UNIDO is responsible for the overall project 
management and implementation by establishing a management team for the 
training academy (arrow D), and providing M&E frameworks through the LKDF 
(arrow E). Volvo represents the private sector in the partnership. The company 
provides the required equipment to the project, facilitates the training of trainers and 
technical support in curriculum and standards development (arrow F). In addition to 
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the fact that Volvo was suffering under the shortage of skilled technicians, the 
involvement of the company can be traced to its larger Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) efforts to contribute to its corporate image-building. STVC is a 
local NGO which has been providing education and vocational training to Ethiopian 
youth in various fields. The NGO will be the project owner, providing the physical 
location and ensuring the sustainability of the training academy after the project is 
over (arrow G). STVC has a reputation in Ethiopia as one of the best vocational 
schools, and this reputation is believed to be further improved with the efforts of the 
HDECoVA project. In addition to these direct stakeholders, the Ethiopian Ministry of 
Education plays an important role ensuring the success of the project. The Ministry 
reviews and certifies the curriculum of the training academy and contributes to the 
project reaching a larger impact on Ethiopian development by promoting the 
founding of similar training centers in the country (arrow H). Finally, the Swedish 
Embassy plays a role in advocacy and political support for the projects (arrow I). 
 
 
 
 
5. RESEARCH FINDINGS  
The following section outlines the incongruities between the experiences of 
respondents and the results measured by the project’s measurement frameworks 
and progress reports, followed by an overview of the challenges the implementing 
agency experienced for measuring results, and how this has lead to an increased 
vulnerability of the donor agency. 
 
5.1 An evaluation of the project’s measurement frameworks and reports 
When making a comparison between the experiences of the respondents involved 
with the implementation of the HDECoVA project (namely Selam, UNIDO and Volvo) 
Figure 2: Roles of the stakeholders 
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on the one hand, and the experiences of the donor stakeholders and the outcomes 
as described in the project’s measurement frameworks and progress reports4 on the 
other, incongruities become visible particularly with regards to four issues (see table 
1).  
 
 Results captured by measurement 
frameworks and progress reports 
Development prospects 
indicated by respondents  
Holistic approach Apart from a description of the policy 
and development context there 
seems to be little focus of the larger 
impact on the country’s economic 
development. 
The project addresses an 
immediate need of the market and 
as such has development 
prospects that reach even beyond 
the creation of employment 
opportunities.  
Systemic 
development impact  
Although the progress reports show 
mention of the efforts that were made 
to bringing about an institutional 
change in the country’s vocational 
training system, the measurement 
framework showed no elements that 
allow for a measurement of this 
impact.  
The training center will serve as a 
model for other vocational training 
institutions, organizations and 
development countries to copy. 
Women 
empowerment 
There does not seem to be a 
particular focus on measuring the 
outcomes of the additional efforts 
that are made for ensuring the 
employment of women after the 
program other than measuring the 
amount of female trainees. 
The training center has dedicated 
significant efforts to promote 
gender equality and empowerment 
for women and girls. 
Additionality No clear analysis of the additionality 
of the donor partner. 
 
The involvement of each partner in 
this PPP setting is critical for 
generating and realizing 
sustainable and systemic 
development prospects. 
 
 
5.1.1 Holistic approach 
The respondents who were directly involved with the implementation and 
management of the project expressed a general consensus that the project 
addresses an immediate need of the market and as such has development 
prospects that reach even beyond the creation of employment opportunities. A 
respondent at Volvo explained that the Ethiopian TVET system has so far failed to 
produce all-rounded technicians with the necessary skills and knowledge to 
immediately put these people to work, which posed significant problems for 
suppliers of trucks and heavy duty equipment in Ethiopia. He believes that project 
directly addresses this gap, as the new vocational training center at Selam ‘will 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 How to calculate the costs and benefits of PPDPs? (LKDF, 2015a); Key Performance 
Indicators (KPIs) (LKDF, 2015b); Mid-Term Review (Tesemma, 2015); Progress Report 
(UNIDO, 2015) 
  Table 1: Incongruences between experiences and reporting 
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produce all-rounded technicians who know everything about a vehicle and have 
experience with the practical side of the job’ 5 . By educating mechanics of 
construction equipment and trucks, the project was believed not only to create 
employment opportunities for its trainees, but also to contribute to the economic 
growth of Ethiopia. A senior functionary of UNIDO in fact emphasized that ‘this 
project is a very ideal way of making good use of money for donors because it is an 
area where there was a clear and immediate demand; a missing link for a very 
important area of economic development’6.  
 Although the project’s potential for structural economic development seems 
to be recognized by the stakeholders directly involved with the implementation of 
the project, a structural analysis of the country’s development needs or inclusive 
measurement framework for this development prospect appears to be missing in 
the reports delivered by the implementing agency. Within the project’s cost and 
benefits framework and the list of KPIs that are proposed to be measured, the focus 
seems to be on measureable, short-term results in terms of for example the number 
of trainees graduating successfully, the increase in student’s income after the 
training, and the average grades of the students. As such, there seems to be little 
focus of the larger impact on the country’s economic development. As a result, a 
representative of Sida argued that while she feels ‘broadly convinced’ by the 
relevance of the project, the project does not resonate with the agency’s efforts to 
work from a holistic perspective, as she reasons that ‘the project lacks a real market 
analysis that evaluates the market for TVET and identifies where the real bottlenecks 
are’7.  
 
5.1.2 Systemic development impact  
The systemic development potential of the project was perceived to be particularly 
promising. A number of respondents stated the HDECoVA project has succeeded in 
building a training center that will serve as a model for other vocational training 
institutions to copy. A representative of the Ethiopian Ministry of Education indeed 
confirmed that: 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Samuel Desta, Volvo, June 5, 2015.  
6 Kassahun Ayele Tesemma, UNIDO, June 10, 2015. 
7 Elin Carlsson, Sida, June 12, 2015. 	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We want to roll out this experience to the other regions. We have only one TVET training 
institution in this country so we have asked Selam to prepare themselves to go to the 
level of polytechnic institutions. If we manage Selam to bring to that level they are 
expected to create more trainers, and then we can create more similar institutions in the 
county. In this way they can influence the implementation of the country’s entire TVET 
system8.  
 
In addition to this, the project has received a lot of interest from different kind of 
organizations and vocational colleges from other countries including Morocco and 
Zambia.  
 While the progress reports showed mention of the efforts that were made to 
bringing about an institutional change in the country’s vocational training system, 
the measurement frameworks did not seem to capture this impact. Both the Mid-
Term Review and the project’s latest Progress Report, reported on the potential of 
the HDECoVA project to serve as a model to create more similar institutions. In fact, 
the reports elaborated the concrete steps that were to be made to maximize the 
project’s systemic development potential. Nevertheless, the cost and benefits 
framework and the list of KPIs developed for the project both showed no specific 
elements that would allow for a measurement of this systemic impact. 
Consequently, while Sida seemed to recognize the project’s potential for a 
systematic impact and the interest that it gets from other players, it was argued that 
‘the results frameworks are not really capturing these elements so it is really a long 
process of making it happen in practice’9. 
 
5.1.3 Women empowerment  
The respondents had experienced the training center to have dedicated significant 
efforts to one of the donor priorities to promote gender equality and empowerment 
for women and girls. According to the Managing Director of Selam, the project 
management tries to encourage female trainees to take the training by addressing 
any specific problems they might have because of their sex10. As a result of these 
efforts, the number of girls enrolled in the program have increased from only one at 
the start of the project, to thirteen in the class that started last year. One of the 
trainers at the center further states that: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Fekadu Asrat, Ethiopian Ministry of Education, June 11, 2015.  
9 Elin Carlsson, Sida, June 12, 2015. 
10 Zenebe Tesfaye, Selam, June 4, 2015.  
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I believe that they [the female trainees] can perform even more than the males but 
generally speaking in the culture of Ethiopia a bit hard for females to engage in technical 
professions. This program makes it easier for females to get into this profession, more 
than a public training center, because we give extra attention to our female trainees for 
instance by giving extra guidance or tutoring11.  
 
The trainer, who received her training from an Austrian foundation, is a good 
example of the contribution that such a development project can have on the 
empowerment of women, as she underlines that ‘without the help of this foundation 
I could not have been doing this work’.  
 Nevertheless, these efforts were merely superficially discussed in the 
reporting of the project. While the list of KPIs developed for the project does 
measure whether the programs are gender balanced, there does not seem to be a 
particular focus on measuring the outcomes of the additional efforts that are made 
for ensuring the employment of women after the program.  
 
5.1.4 Additionality12   
For Sida, one of the purposes of the reports is to demonstrate the additionality of 
their involvement as a donor partner in the HDECoVA project and that to 
demonstrate that they are making a good use of public resources, i.e. that it is not 
used to finance activities that a company could and would undertake anyway. 
Indeed, the various groups of stakeholders perceived the involvement of each 
partner in this PPP setting to be critical for generating and realizing its development 
opportunities. Even though there are reasons to assume that Volvo would have 
taken actions to train heavy duty mechanics regardless of Sida’s participation in the 
project13, the respondents were convinced that the participation of the Swedish 
development agency has advanced the development impact of the project in several 
ways. Most importantly, the donor agency has had a unique role in bringing different 
stakeholders in the project together, including the Ministry of Education and UNIDO, 
that would otherwise not have been involved. The involvement of these stakeholders 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Asmeret G/Kidan, Selam, June 10, 2015.  
12 This study follows the Donor Committee for Enterprise Development’s (DCED) definition of 
additionality, namely ‘that the partnership triggers an activity that would not otherwise have 
happened at all, or in the same way, extent, or time’ (Heinrich, 2014, p.13) 
13 For example, in 2010 Volvo announced a major order 1000 trucks that included supplying 
transport competence development and building a service organization (Volvo, 2010). It 
could be argued that Volvo had to train new mechanics to be able to deliver this order 
regardless of whether Sida had taken part in the project.  
 19 
have, in turn, been described as particularly important for advancing the project’s 
development impact on the country. For example with regards to UNIDO’s role as 
the implementing agency, a representative of the Ministry of Education explains that 
the major constrain for implementing the country’s TVET system is the lack of 
competent trainers. Through UNIDO, the training center has been equipped with 
skilled trainers and an educational structure that matches international standards14. 
On this note, the Managing Director of Selam argues that ‘more than the equipment, 
more than the machinery, which I appreciate, the knowledge and skills sharing are 
the most important things for an underdeveloped county’15. In addition, Sida’s 
engagement is considered to go beyond financial contributions as it has contributed 
in terms of controlling whether the money has been spent effectively and 
supervising whether the local team follows the project document. It was further 
perceived that Volvo has played a key role in the success of the project as the 
company has been closely involved with setting up the curriculum of the project and 
making sure that the graduates’ skills and competences are closely aligned with the 
market needs. A senior official of UNIDO further explains that ‘if Volvo had not 
participated, the quality would have been compromised because there was no 
standard to which we could guide and measure how the school should be run’16.  
 As the measurement frameworks and progress reports were developed to 
indicate the performance of the project, it is maybe not surprising that they do not 
include an explicit analysis of the additionality of the donor partner. Nevertheless, as 
the additionality of Sida was described by the respondents in terms of the larger 
development potential of the project, the previously discussed incongruities appear 
to have made it difficult for the agency to make a convincing case for the 
additionality of their support. Indeed, a representative at Sida indeed expressed her 
concerns about this issue as she clarifies that:  
 
We know that what we can do that they Volvo can’t do and wouldn’t have done is to 
invest in a systemic change. […] Even if the program did not come up with that analysis, 
we have drawn that conclusion. And then if we have that hypothesis, that the bigger 
development outcome outreach impact is our additionality, more than just training 
certain people to be better at their jobs or to get new types of jobs, then we need to 
assure the systemic change element of the program is really there and is fairly tight17.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Fekadu Asrat, Ethiopian Ministry of Education, June 11, 2015. 
15 Zenebe Tesfaye, Selam, June 4, 2015. 
16 Kassahun Ayele Tesemma, UNIDO, June 10, 2015. 
17 Elin Carlsson, Sida, June 12, 2015. 
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5.2 Identifying the challenges of measuring results  
As demonstrated in the previous section, incongruities exist between the 
experiences of the respondents involved with the implementation of the project 
performance as described in the project’s measurement frameworks and progress 
reports. In spite of recognized efforts by UNIDO and LKDF to develop all-inclusive 
assessment practices, the experiences of the respondents indicated three main 
issues that might have constrained the implementing agencies’ ability to address 
these incongruities.  
 First, the demands for results imply making the outcomes and performance 
of the project measurable, which was perceived problematic considering the 
qualitative nature of much of its development potential. While the costs were easy to 
measure, many of the benefits and results of the project were not quantifiable. This 
in turn made it difficult for the implementing agencies to report on a positive return 
on investment. The agencies tried to address this problem by complementing the 
quantitative measurements with a qualitative approach in the form of interviews with 
various stakeholders of the project. 
 Secondly, much of the impact that the project is expected to generate was 
perceived to be long-term development that is not measurable at such an early 
stage of the project. A senior officer at UNIDO explained that ‘there are different 
techniques that we [UNIDO] are trying to work on, for example by considering the 
baseline situation and measuring what difference the project will make. But of 
course at this stage this could not have been done because we have to wait until 
the end of the project or at least until the graduates go into the market’18. As a 
result, there were a number of concerns related to whether too much effort was 
focused on measuring short-term results. The Managing Director of Selam 
emphasized that ‘when you relate the investment to the number of graduates, you 
have a wrong calculation. You have to consider that you are investing for the 
coming 30 years and hundreds graduates are still coming’19. 
 Thirdly, the respondents experienced difficulties in the process of 
operationalization as there were no agreed-on guidelines of how certain results were 
conceptualized in project appraisals. For example with regards to the project’s 
systemic impact, a consultant working for LKDF explained that ‘we have considered 
including it in the KPIs but in the end we have not because it is really difficult to say 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Kassahun Ayele Tesemma, UNIDO, June 10, 2015. 
19 Zenebe Tesfaye, Selam, June 4, 2015. 
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what kind of systemic change we are actually trying to reach’20. When it comes to 
the issue of gender equality, it was clear that UNIDO recognized the value of 
including it in the analysis, but had troubles turning the gender sensitive indicators 
into a measurement of the additional efforts that were made to empower the female 
trainees at the learning center.  
 
5.3 Increased vulnerability of the donor agency  
As a result of the constrains experienced by the implementing agencies to include 
certain development potentials in the measurement frameworks and progress 
reports, Sida has perceived an increased vulnerability to criticism from critical 
watchdogs. A representative of Sida expressed this as follows: 
 
The Swedish development cooperation is very much watched and as a result, we have 
more pressure to demonstrate results in a much more tangible manner now than we did 
three or four years ago. […] So its not just our own honor knowing that we are working in 
line with best practices and where the evidence is, it’s also quite real. Whatever mistake 
we make, we have to be prepared for official lynching21.  
 
The reports from the implementing agencies were perceived to make Sida 
particularly vulnerable for criticism on whether the partnership is a good use of 
public resources and that Sida is not, as a representative of the Section for Bilateral 
Development Cooperation of the Swedish embassy puts it, ‘merely funding a private 
sector with aid money’22. A representative at Sida confirms that the agency indeed 
does not feel grounded in the analyses attached to the project as they do not 
provide scientific backing that their approach is effective for generating a positive 
impact on development. She continues to explain that: 
 
If we want to justify our actions and really have our case clear when people start asking 
how we set up our PPPs, I’d much rather see that we have a bottom-up approach rather 
then some business leaders realize that “we are all Swedish and we want to do 
something in Africa”23.  
 
The challenges with regards to UNIDO’s ability to address these vulnerabilities in its 
reports has at some point even caused tensions between the two agencies. As a 
result, Sida has considered stepping out of the project because they were 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Katharina Kerres, LKDF, June 11, 2015.  
21 Elin Carlsson, Sida, June 12, 2015. 
22 Anneka Knutsson, Embassy of Sweden in Addis Ababa, June 3, 2015. 
23 Elin Carlsson, Sida, June 12, 2015. 
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disappointed with UNIDO and the progress they reported compared to what was 
agreed on in the set-up of the project.   
 
6. DISCUSSION OF RESEARCH FINDINGS  
Based on the findings of the study, there are reasons to assume that tensions can 
arise between the responsibility of a donor agency to respond to the increasing 
demand for performance-based accountability and the process of implementing 
these increased demands through extensive measurement tools and progress 
reporting. First, the findings indicate a particular focus of the measurement 
frameworks and progress reports on quantifiable and short-term development 
outcomes. Although the UNIDO clearly acknowledged and reinforced the project’s 
prospects for sustainable and transformational development, the measurement and 
evaluation practitioners experienced a pressure for making the result measurable, 
making it difficult for them to include development potential that was difficult to 
measure or operationalize. This raises concerns about whether the strict focus on 
results, in particular on reporting them, in fact has caused the implementing 
agencies to disregard unquantifiable or complex processes such as capacity 
development or gender empowerment that can sustain real and durable change.   
 The findings draw attention to the prospects of the project of achieving 
sustainable economic development. In addition, the development potential as 
indicated by the respondents provides good reasons to believe that the PPP will 
provide outcomes that are line with the Swedish government’s expectations with 
regards to the results it wishes to contribute to through this type of aid settings. 
First, when considering the six sub-objectives of the Swedish aid policy framework 
(see page 12), the activities and result of the HDECoVA project seems to contribute 
to at least two of its sub-objectives, namely (1) strengthened democracy and gender 
equality, greater respect for human rights and freedom from oppression, and (2) 
better opportunities for people living in poverty to contribute to and benefit from 
economic growth and obtain a good education. As such, the project seems to be 
relevant according to the government’s assessment of this principle. In addition, the 
findings seem to indicate that the project will reach its overall objective and that the 
particular, pointing to the effectiveness of the PPP. Yet the emphasis on measuring 
short-term development outcomes, such as the number of graduating trainees, and 
the grades of the trainees, makes invisible the PPPs potential to achieve these 
development objectives and be in line with the donor country development 
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priorities. At the core of this logic is that the most transformational and sustainable 
development prospects and outcomes are also the most difficult measurable, while 
those most precisely and easily measured are in fact the least transformational and 
sustainable.  
 When evaluating this process of implementing the increased demands for 
demonstrating results, it appears that while the actual outcomes of a PPP could 
match the expectations of the account-holder, the outcomes captured by the results 
framework and performance reports may not. The tools at hand for the donor 
agency to answer to the increased demand for performance-based accountability 
may hence not sufficiently capture the accountability of the actions of the donor, 
and may even lead to and increased vulnerability of the donor agency to critical 
questions towards it accountability.  
 
	  
 
 
Figure 3 gives an overview of the tensions between the responsibility of a donor 
agency to respond to the increasing demand for performance-based accountability 
and the process of implementing these increased demands through extensive 
measurement tools and progress reporting, as outlined above. The findings indicate 
a feedback loop24, where each element positively influences the next. The logic 
behind it is as follows. The respondents have indicated that the increased pressure 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 A feedback loop is a causal loop diagram in which the outgoing effect of a change in a 
variable will follow a path through the process to come back as an input in this same 
variable. 
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to demonstrate results on the donor agency has grown out of increased criticism 
against the effectiveness of aid and the agency’s lack of scientific backing and 
reports to justify their actions. The increased demand for performance-based 
accountability has, in turn, affected the pressure the agency puts on its partners to 
report results in a much more tangible manner. Due to the difficulty of measuring 
qualitative results quantitatively, measuring results that may only be tangible in the 
long-term, and the difficulty of operationalizing certain development outcomes, 
respondents at the implementing agency have indicated that they do not feel 
equipped to measure particular outcomes of the project, the measurement 
frameworks and progress reports indicate a particular focus on quantifiable and 
short-term development outcomes. These short-term development outcomes, 
however, do not adequately underpin the project’s prospect to achieve 
transformative and development objectives, and results that are in fact in line with 
the donor country development priorities. The results measured by the 
measurement frameworks and outlined in the progress reports are therefor not in 
line with the expectations of the donor agency’s account-holder, making the donor 
agency vulnerable for critical questions. The increased vulnerability of the donor 
agency, which has caused the pressure to demonstrate results at the beginning of 
the process, might cause the pressure to demonstrate results to grow even more. 
This brings us back to the first element in the loop.   
 The positive character of the feedback loop implies that the tensions 
experienced in the current case study might grow exponentially in the future, as 
each element continues to intensify the next in the process. Ultimately, the focus on 
results might imply that PPP projects become less focused on addressing the most 
complex development challenges or take on projects that appear to be less risky at 
the outset. By focusing on projects that have the potential to reach more tangible 
development outcomes, the problem of measuring the results of a PPP project 
automatically becomes a lesser constrain. On the contrary, if PPP projects maintain 
their ambition to focus on systemic development, the tensions between donor 
agencies and implementing agencies might increase. In the current case study, the 
donor agency has already indicated that it had at some point considered stepping 
out because it was disappointed with the progress of the project. In case these 
tensions escalate in future projects, this may lead to donor agencies pulling out the 
plug before the end of the project because they might not be convinced by its 
performance or its development potential.  
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The source of these tensions can be tracked to the accountability hierarchy that 
underlies the PPP setting (see Figure 4). In this accountability hierarchy, the donor 
agency (agent) is accountable to the donor government (principal) and in order to 
respond to this accountability, the donor agency is put under pressure to 
demonstrate that the aid money is spent in a relevant and effective way. The 
implementing agency (agent) that is selected to implement and manage a PPP 
project is in turn put under pressure by the donor agency (principle) to demonstrate 
results indicating that the project is indeed achieving sustainable development. The 
measurement frameworks and progress reports that the implementing agency 
develops and sends back to the donor agency, is then built on by the donor agency 
to prove that the aid money is indeed bringing about sustainable development 
allowing it account for its inputs. If the results, or performance, captured by these 
frameworks and reports meet the expectations of the donor government, there is no 
reason to believe that any tensions should exist between the responsibility of a 
donor agency to respond to the increasing demand for performance-based 
accountability and the process of implementing these increased demands through 
extensive measurement tools and progress reporting. That is, the donor agency 
should not be vulnerable to criticism because it has tangible underpinnings that 
justify its actions.  
 However, as seen in the current case study, the measurement tools and 
reporting do not always address the results or development that would the donor 
agency to respond to its accountability of their account-holders. Based on the 
findings of this study there are three reasons that could lead to this mismatch. First, 
as elaborated on in a prior section of this paper, implementing agencies might 
experience measurement problems constraining them from measuring and reporting 
on the development impact of a PPP project. Secondly, certain development goals 
Figure 4: Accountability hierarchy  
 26 
might not be communicated in the outset of the project, making it difficult for the 
implementing agency to know what to focus on when developing its assessment 
indicators. Furthermore, when the development goals are added as a priority at a 
later stage in the project, the implementing agency might experience difficulties to 
make this goal operational or to demonstrate that the project has been develop 
based on a scientific underpinning. Finally, there might be a change in the donor 
agency’s priorities or development goals in the course of the project. Most PPP 
projects have a lifetime of several years and the chances that the donor government 
has shifted its aid policy (for example after governmental elections) or that the donor 
agency has shifted its approach (for example after reorganizations) is real.  
 The case study has made visible the tensions that can arise between the 
increased pressures on a donor agency to demonstrate performance and its 
practices to answer to these demands through a focus on results. Yet, it seems 
uncontested that donor agencies should be able to account for the projects where 
they spend tax money on and that performance indicators are needed to make 
informed judgments about the impact of their actions. Taking into consideration the 
three reasons for the mismatch between the results-based expectations of account-
holders and the results included in measurement frameworks and progress reports 
as identified in the section above, several suggestions will be made on how to 
minimize these tensions in the future.  
 First, the case study underpins the importance of continuous communication 
between the donor agency and the implementing agency with regards to the 
project’s performance, the results as captured by the measurement frameworks and 
the progress reports, and whether these results are in line with the expectations of 
the donor agency’s account-holders. Although this might appear to be 
straightforward, the present case study shows unfortunate miscommunications 
between what the donor agency expects from the reporting, how these issues 
should be operationalized and why it is important for the donor agency that certain 
outcomes are captured by the reports. An increased awareness of both partners of 
this misalignment of expectations and assumptions would allow the implementing 
agency to recognize the mismatch and realign its measurement priorities at an 
earlier stage of the reporting process.  
 Second, the implementing agency might benefit from actively considering 
the expectations for results of the donor agency’s account-holder and include 
similar discourse and assessment schemes in reporting on the results of the PPP 
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project. Currently the measurement frameworks and progress reports are largely 
built on the expected development as outlined in the project document at the outset 
of the project, and on the experiences and extensive desk research of M&E experts. 
Basing the measurement frameworks on the expectations for results of the donor 
government could, however, help the donor agency to justify the aid program to a 
skeptical public.  
 Third, the implementing agency could consider including outcomes that 
place the project in a larger development context. Currently, the difficulties for 
measuring long-term development have constrained the implementing agencies to 
effectively measure the development impact of the project. Nevertheless, the 
reports could start to include the project’s development potential by considering 
how the results contribute to the development country’s needs and strategies for 
development. This could be done by justifying the development potential with 
analytical underpinnings, or by providing indicators of the development prospects. 
For example, in the current case the implementing agency could measure how many 
TVET schools have showed interest in the HDECoVA project.  
 Finally, the M&E practitioner might benefit from taking an inductive rather 
than a deductive approach. That is, make observations in the field, discern a 
pattern, and infer a measurement framework based on these findings, rather than 
developing a measurement framework from a distance and measure the elements of 
the framework during a trip to the field. This would allow the M&E practitioners to 
give attention to the mechanisms and practices that reach beyond the obvious 
outcomes of the project. For example, in the present case study, the implementing 
agency could give more focus to the value of foreign expertise and knowledge 
management that might indicate the additionality of the partners in this PPP setting.  
 
7. CONCLUSION  
By exposing and comparing the perceptions of key stakeholders in a current PPP 
project in Ethiopia, this study aimed to investigate the practices of a development 
agency involved in a PPP to account for its involvement in the project. The study 
shows that tensions arise between the increased pressure on the donor agency to 
demonstrate accountability based on performance and its practices to answer to 
these demands through a focus on results. In our case study, this tension has lead 
to an increased vulnerability of the donor agency and caused serious challenges for 
the donor-implementing agency relationship. The findings indicate a feedback loop, 
 28 
which might imply that the tensions may cause PPPs to ultimately become less 
focused on addressing complex development challenges. Alternatively, donor 
agencies may decide to step out of a PPP because they may not be convinced that 
a project’s performance or development potential will allow the donor agency to 
account for its inputs. An analysis of the findings shows that the source of these 
tensions can be tracked to the accountability hierarchy that underlies the PPP 
setting. The hierarchy model illustrates how three reasons could trigger a mismatch 
between the results-based expectations of the donor agency’s account-holder and 
results outline in the measurement frameworks and progress reports: (1) 
implementing agencies might experiences measurement problems, development 
goals might not be communicated in the outset of the project, (2) there might be a 
change in the donor agency’s priorities or (3) development goals in the course of the 
project. Based on this model, suggestions have been made as to how to limit these 
tensions in future development projects. 
 It is important to note that although the present study focuses solely on the 
accountability of the donor agencies to the donor country’s government, there are 
many different levels of accountability within the development cooperation system. 
These can include the domestic accountability of partner countries to their own 
populations or the mutual accountability between partners and donors. Further 
research that considers the problems with result-driven accountability, as revealed 
in the present study, in the wider context of complex and sometimes even conflicted 
accountability levels could shed light on the underlying institutional dynamics and 
power relations that set the stage for the way development priorities are defined an 
worked on.  
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